The authors of the second retreat used the following example to discuss how to calculate the amount of damages resulting from the confiscation of a promissory note: A young man`s uncle promises to give him $1,000 to buy a car. The young man buys a car for $500, but the uncle refuses to pay money. Is the young man entitled to $1,000 (the amount promised) or only $500 (the amount he actually lost)? The rewording states: “The remedy granted for violations may be limited if the courts so require.” — Leave the quantification to the discretion of the court. There are many types of forfeiture that can occur under common law legal systems. It has been established more than once legally that the link between them is often somewhat weak. Treitel on Contracts states that “the lack of scruples. makes the link between them”, but they still have “distinct requirements and different fields of application”.  The courts have long since abandoned the attempt to create a single underlying general logic or principle: the Forfeiture of Contracts Act was summarized in Peekay Intermark Ltd v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd  EWCA Civ 386: Both Halsbury`s and Spencer Bower (see below), who collectively describe these three forges as confiscations by representation. In simpler terms, one party must say or do something and see that the other party relies on what is said or done to change behavior. The doctrine of forfeiture of promissory notes prevents a party from withdrawing a promise from a second party if the latter has reasonably relied on that commitment. However, confiscation does not apply to representations of fundamental rights granted by the Constitution of India, the source of all laws that are there not only to benefit individuals, but also to guarantee collective rights.
No one can therefore exchange the freedoms given to him by the Constitution. A concession he has made in the course of a procedure, whether because of an error of law or for other reasons that he does not possess or will not enforce a specific fundamental right, cannot prevent it, since the execution of the confiscation would undermine the purpose of the Constitution.  “Who, by his speech or conduct, should not be allowed to adopt an inconsistent position, attitude or conduct, must not be chosen to lose or hurt anyone else.  For example, between two or more claimants, a party with multiple and conflicting legal positions is prevented from expressing its views against another persistent and specific claim, that is, preferential treatment for certain claims over uncertain claims. — also called by judgment forfeiture, exclusion from dispute settlement A variant of estoppel also prevents a party from bringing an action in subsequent proceedings, which should have been properly brought in previous judicial proceedings.  The doctrine of forfeiture of promissory notes was incorporated into Australian law in Legione v. Hateley. However, the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in this case because the trust was inappropriate and the promise was ambiguous.  Although there is also an exclusive doctrine of confiscation, the High Court of Australia has merged this doctrine with the doctrine of order estoppel on the basis of similar criteria.  Forfeiture is a fair interpretation (as opposed to the common law), and its application is therefore a matter of discretion.
In the case of D&C Builders v Rees refused to acknowledge a promise to accept a partial payment of £300 on a debt of £482, on the grounds that it had been extracted by coercion. In Combe v. Combe Denning, she explained the just nature of confiscation by refusing to allow it to be used as a “sword” by an ex-wife to obtain funds from the destitute husband. Estoppel by agreement in English law (also known as estoppel by agreement) occurs when two parties negotiate or exploit a contract but make a mistake. If they share a hypothesis, belief or understanding of the interpretation or legal effect of the contract, then they are bound by it if: [Citation required] Estoppel in pais (literally “by act of notoriety” or “solemn formal act”) is the historical root of confiscation by representation and equitable estoppel. The terms Estoppel in Pais and Equitable Estoppel are used interchangeably in U.S. law. In general, confiscation is “a shield, not a sword” – it cannot be used alone as the basis for an act.
 It does not remove any rights either. In High Trees, the plaintiff company was able to restore payment of the full rent from early 1945 and could have reinstated the entire rent at any time in accordance with the original promise, provided that reasonable notice had been given. In this case, confiscation has been applied to a “negative promise”, i.e. a promise in which a party promises not to enforce all rights. In the context of estoppel, a court may, after ruling on a question of fact or law necessary for its judgment, exclude a new dispute in a dispute concerning another plea to which the first case is a party. The remedy for the prevention of security interests is not applicable if the plaintiff has not had a “full and fair opportunity” to hear the issue decided by the other court. Thus, a plaintiff can file a federal lawsuit to challenge the adequacy of the state`s procedures. Usually, collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the party that wants to use it, otherwise it will be lifted. In English law, Estoppel by representation of fact is a term coined by Spencer Bower. This type of estoppel is also referred to as “common law estoppel by representation” in Halsbury`s Laws of England, Volume 16(2), reissued in 2003. In some cases, the issue estoppel (better known as the exclusion of the issue) prevents the renegotiation of an issue that has already been negotiated and decided on the merits, even if the parties are different.
In the world of crime, some cases have gained notoriety, for example: in the saga of the Birmingham Six, the House of Lords in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police (1982) ruled that the issue of confiscation applied. Lord Diplock said: The Court of Appeal`s decision in Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd suggests that the doctrine of forfeiture of promissory notes can now mitigate the seriousness of this common law rule.  In addition, Arden LJ considered that it would be unfair in itself to allow a creditor not to keep its promise to demand the balance of a debt in exchange for partial payment. Therefore, the only trust that the promisor must prove is the actual payment of the coin. This approach has been criticized for inflicting violence on the hughes principle and the extent to which the other members of the Court, namely Longmore LJ, have endorsed it is uncertain. It is questionable whether forfeiture by convention is a separate doctrine from forfeiture or simply a case of forfeiture based on trust (forfeiture by representation would be its most common form) or whether the rule of interpretation is that when the words of a contract are ambiguous, those words are always interpreted in such a way that the actual intentions of the parties are put into practice, although this is not the usual legal outcome (see Amalgamated Investment and Property Co. Ltd. v. Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd  QB 84).
Estoppel is a legal principle that prevents someone from asserting or asserting a right that contradicts what they have already said or accepted by law. It aims to prevent people from being unfairly harmed by inconsistencies in another person`s words or actions. The unscrupulous test in the English and Australian courts takes into account many factors, including the behaviour, state of mind and circumstances of the parties. In general, the following eight factors are decisive: Confiscation by tolerance can occur when one person gives a legal warning to another person on the basis of a clearly stated fact or principle of law and the other person does not respond within a “reasonable time”.